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This study analyzes the factors that determine the demand for milk products and 
the consumer benefits from organic milk introduction. Estimating a structural 
model, the welfare effect is decomposed into two parts: the effect of having an 
additional product and the effect from the price changes in existing products due 
to the enhanced competition. In order to take heterogeneous tastes for different 
product  characteristics  into  account,  the  unit  of  analysis  is  defined  at  the 
Universal  Product  Code  (UPC)  level  and  the  demand  is  estimated  for  each 
household.    The  estimates  from  mixed  logit  demand  approach  indicate  that 
households with younger head, higher income or higher education value more 
for the  organic  attribute.   The  distribution  of  estimated  variety  effect  shows 
similar implications as the parameter estimates. The compensating variation and 
price effects indicate that the overall benefits take about 8 percent of the current 
expenditure and half of it is from increased competition in the market.    
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Firms  have  been  seeking  market  power  by  constantly  differentiating  their  products  from 
competitors.    Firms  can  make  more  profits  associated  with  first  movers’  advantage  by 
introducing new products.  Consumers also benefit from the new product developments.  How 
much consumers benefit from the quality improvement or additional attributes of the new good, 
variety  effect  (VE),  and  how  much  consumers  benefit  from  the  price  changes  of  existing 
products driven by enhanced competition on the supply side, price effect (PE), are important 
economic questions  to  firms  that formulate innovation and competition policy  and to  policy 
makers who regulate the market.  Moreover, the welfare analysis at individual household level 
will provide more complete information for their decision-making procedure.  
Although new product introduction is more frequent in high tech industries, recent innovations in 
the agricultural industry also make new products, such as Genetically Modified (GM) food and 3 
 
Organic  food,  available  to  consumers.    While  various  opinions  on  the  effect  of  GM  food 
products are not in agreement, consumers’ concern on health and environment increase demand 
for organic food.  As part of the organic food market, the organic milk market has also been 
growing.  According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), organic cow milk 
and soy milk drinks are the top two categories among processed organic products next to fresh 
products.  Many studies analyze the demand for organic milk in various contexts in a timely 
manner, but very few studies are done in the context of welfare effects.  To my knowledge, Dhar 
and Foltz (2005) is the only paper that analyzes the demand for organic milk in the context of its 
welfare impacts.  They estimate the demand for milk and the welfare effect of specialty milk at 
the industry level categorizing milk products into three segments: recombinant bovine growth 
hormone (rBST) free labeled milk, organic labeled milk, and unlabeled (conventional) milk.  The 
main weakness of their study is that their model does not take consumers’ heterogeneous tastes 
into account.  The absence of taste variables might lead to inaccurate estimates of welfare effects 
because the expected utility accounted for by taste variables will fall into the idiosyncratic error 
terms which will not be accounted in the welfare computation.  
In this light, this study analyzes demand for milk at the disaggregated level of the industry, i.e., 
individual households’ demand for milk products at the brand level.  The demand model is 
specified at the individual household level to account for heterogeneous consumer behavior.  The 
unit of analysis is defined at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level to accommodate product 
characteristics  and consumer preferences.   A discrete choice  approach is  employed  to  avoid 
dimensionality and missing value problems that usually occur in neo-classical demand systems 
defined at disaggregate levels.  The model is specified with a random coefficient (or Mixed) logit 
following  Berry  et  al.  (2004)  to  incorporate  both  observed  and  unobserved  heterogeneous 
consumer tastes.  However, the model is estimated for individual households utilizing household 
level data while Berry et al. (2004) estimate the model at the market level utilizing aggregate 
data.  The welfare effects of organic milk are measured with compensating variation in a partial 
equilibrium framework by computing both variety effects and price effects.  The variety effects 
measure  consumer’s  willingness-to-pay  for  the  utility  increase  from  the  additional  products 
holding the existing product prices constant at the post-introduction level.  The price effects 4 
 
measure the welfare change from the existing products’ price changes that are due to enhanced 
competition among suppliers after the introduction of new goods.   
The  results  indicate  that  the  age,  income  and  education  of  the  head  in  each  household  are 
associated  with  the  preferences  on  the  different  types  of  milk  products.    For  example,  the 
parameter estimates evidence the preferences for organic milk of households with higher income, 
higher  education  or  younger  head.    The  estimated  distributions  of  variety  effects  show  that 
households  with  higher  income  or/and  higher  education  value  organic  option  more  than 
households with lower income or/and lower education do.  Households with elder heads do not 
value the organic characteristic as much as ones with younger heads.  
The literature will be reviewed in section II and the structure of dairy industry is summarized in 
Section III.  Section IV and section V discuss the model and the estimation methods, respectively.  
The results are presented in section VI and section VII concludes the study.  
II.  Literature Review 
Discrete Choice Models 
Different  types of discrete choice models  are developed in the studies  where heterogeneous 
consumer tastes as well as the quality of products matter.  In the discrete choice framework, the 
rational behavior of heterogeneous consumers is defined such that the consumer is assumed to 
choose one utility maximizing alternative from a set of choices that are mutually exclusive, 
exhaustive and finite.  The utility an individual receives from choosing one alternative is known 
to the decision maker, but it is not completely observed by the researcher.  Under the Random 
Utility Maximization (RUM) framework, different types of discrete choice models are derived 
depending on the distributional assumptions on unobserved component of the utility function. 
The  logit  model  can  be  derived  if  and  only  if  the  error  term  of  RUM  is  independent  and 
identically distributed and has a type I extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution.  McFadden (1984) 
shows that the logit formula necessarily implies that unobserved utility is distributed extreme 
value.  While the logit model is proven to work well in many applications, the model exhibits the 5 
 
Independence  from  Irrelevant  Alternatives  (IIA)  property  which  states  that  the  ratio  of 
purchasing probabilities for any two alternatives does not depend on any alternatives other than 
the two given alternatives.  As pointed out by Chipman (1960) and Debreu (1960), this property 
is not behaviorally plausible in many cases although it may be realistic in some applications.  
The weakness of this property is well explained throughout the literature using the famous red 
bus/ blue bus problem developed by McFadden (1974). 
In order to overcome the limitations of IIA property, models with more general dependence on 
explanatory  variables  and  distributions  that  permit  more  general  substitution  patterns  are 
introduced.  For example, Ben-Akiva (1973) and Train et al. (1987) use nested logit models in 
which the set of alternatives faced by a decision maker can be partitioned into subsets so that IIA 
does not exist for alternatives in different subsets.  However, the application of this model is 
limited  because  IIA  still  holds  within  each  subset/nest,  and  the  model  does  not  explain 
unobserved preferences to the product characteristics.  The probit model is derived by Marschak 
(1960) under the assumption of joint normal distribution of the error terms.  The probit model 
not only overcomes the IIA property, but also represents random taste variation unlike standard 
logit or nested logit models.  However, the model is restrictive in the sense that it requires 
normal distributions for all unobserved components of utility and its choice probability does not 
have a closed form so that the estimation requires exhaustive simulation.   
Mixed logit models can be an alternative that is flexible and computationally practical. Defined 
as a multinomial logit model with random coefficients drawn from cumulative distributions, the 
mixed logit model accounts for unobserved taste variations and relaxes the IIA property.  The 
underlying mixing distributions can be any parametric family such as multivariate normal or log 
normal.  However,  by  keeping  the  idiosyncratic  error  term  as  iid  extreme  value,  the  model 
presents some properties of standard logit such that the choice probability has a closed form so 
that the simulation is relatively simple.  In addition, mixed logit can approximate any Random 
Utility Maximization model under mild regulatory conditions (McFadden and Train 2000), while 
nested logit cannot represent all RUM consistent behavior and RUM consistent probit model 
requires  special  restrictions  on  covariance  structures  (McFadden  1981,  1984).    Mixed  logit 
approach has been known for many years, but full application with individual consumer tastes 6 
 
was  not  available  until  recent  years  mainly  due  to  the  difficulties  of  simulation  and  the 
unavailability of revealed consumer level preference data.  In early applications, such as Boyd 
and Mellman (1980) and Cardell and Dunbar (1980), explanatory variables are invariant over 
individual households and the dependant variable is market share rather than individual choice.  
Later, BLP used socioeconomic variables but the choice probabilities are estimated at the market 
level utilizing aggregate data.  Empirical studies at the individual consumer level, Train et al 
(1987) and Ben-Akiva et al. (1993), are also conducted, but only one or two dimensions of 
random coefficients are included due to the intensity of computation.  Only a few recent papers 
in recreational cite choices, such as Murdock (2006) and Timmins and Murdock (2007), show 
the full power of mixed logits
1. 
Demand for Differentiated Goods and Welfare Studies 
Studies  on  the  welfare  effects  of  new  product  introduction  have  been  conducted  in  many 
industries in various contexts from competitive structure of the industry to the true cost of living 
price index.  As the industries become competitive, new product introduction is not an unusual 
phenomenon and new products are usually in the form of differentiated goods which are closely 
related but not identical.  Accordingly, various methodologies estimating demands for a set of 
differentiated products are also developed to describe the market in the analysis.     
Hausman and Leonard (2002) estimate the benefits to consumers associated with the introduction 
of a brand of bath tissue product adopting Gorman’s multi-stage budgeting approach.  Under the 
assumption  of  weakly  separable  preferences,  Gorman  argues  that  consumers  allocate  their 
income  into  broad  groups  of  commodities  at  higher  stages  of  budgeting  and  more  detailed 
within-group  allocation  happens  at  lower  levels.    Thus,  the  demand  functions  at  each  stage 
depend  only  on  group  expenditure  and  prices  of  products  within  the  group.    Hausman  and 
Leonard show that one can use this framework to formulate and estimate demand systems of 
differentiated goods in the Neoclassical demand framework.  However, the main limitation of 
this approach is that it is difficult to apply at the individual household level because one can 
encounter  a  lot  of  zero  purchasing  observations  and  the  estimation  requires  the  integrals  of 
                                                           
1 To my knowledge, this paper is the first application of consumer level mixed logit in milk (food) demand literature. 7 
 
multivariate probability density function that can be computationally cumbersome.  Moreover, 
the model is somewhat restricted in its ability to accommodate a large number of commodities.   
An  alternative  to  the  market-level  representative  agent  approach  is  to  incorporate  consumer 
preferences over products as a function of consumer characteristics and product attributes in a 
discrete  choice  framework.    There  have  been  many  efforts  to  analyze  the  demand  for 
differentiated goods that reflects individual preferences.  A few examples that are studied in the 
context of the welfare effects of new goods are summarized here.  Trajtenberg (1989) suggests a 
discrete choice model with consumer and product attributes to measure the welfare change from 
computed topography (CT) scanners innovation although the characteristic variables could not 
be included in the actual estimation due to computational difficulty presented at that time.  Berry, 
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), BLP hereafter, provide techniques to estimate demand and supply 
for a class of differentiated products which only requires aggregate market-level data on the 
prices,  quantities  sold,  and  characteristics  of  the  products.  They  incorporate  consumer 
characteristics into the model by drawing pseudo data from Census data.  BLP (1993) show that 
their procedure makes it possible to construct a price index closer to the true cost of living index 
that  accounts  for  new  product  introduction  with  the  application  to  the  automobile  industry.  
Petrin (2002) also studies the consumer benefits from the minivan introduction in the automobile 
industry.    He  estimates  a  market-level  demand  function  that  accounts  for  consumer-level 
heterogeneity in tastes using market-level data on sales and characteristics, with information that 
relates  the  average  demographics  of  consumers  to  the  characteristics  of  the  products  they 
purchase.  He also finds that models without micro data yield much larger welfare numbers, 
primarily because the micro data appear to free the model from a heavy dependence on the 
idiosyncratic logit taste error.  Although his method provides more precise estimates of demand 
when  a  researcher  is  constrained  to  market  level  data,  it  cannot  substitute  for  a  model 
incorporating consumer-level data. 
One thing noticeable in this literature is that past studies in this area have mostly focused on 
developing estimation techniques to incorporate consumer taste variations under the constraint 
that  only  market  level  data  are  available  and  there  are  computational  difficulties  of  multi-
dimensional integration.   8 
 
III.  The Model 
Following Nevo (2002) a structural model is proposed to measure the consumer welfare from 
organic milk introduction in a partial equilibrium framework. As mentioned, a mixed logit model 
is  specified  to  describe  the  demands  for  milk.    The  consumer  welfare  is  measured  with 
compensating variation that is decomposed into two effects: variety effects and price effects.  
Hausman and Leonard (2002) estimate the price effects through “direct” and “indirect” methods.   
The direct price effects estimate price changes for existing products using both pre- and post-
introduction data without putting any competitive structure on the model.  The indirect price 
effects only use post-introduction data utilizing profit maximizing behavior of firms to simulate 
counterfactual prices at which consumers would have to pay for the existing products if the new 
product were not introduced.  
In many welfare studies, indirect estimation is frequently used to predict price effects even if 
enough series of data are available due to the difficulties that may occur in some applications of 
direct estimation.  First, it is hard to clearly distinguish pre- and post-introduction data when the 
exact time of introduction is not known or the product is gradually introduced over time and 
region.  Second, it is difficult to control other variables that affect the prices if the emergence of 
other factors coincides with the introduction of the new product.  Finally, welfare estimates differ 
according to the length of time period before and after the introduction included in the direct 
computation as shown in Ferrier and Zhen (2010).  Since the time of organic milk introduction 
cannot be represented as a single point, although the data for organic purchases in this region are 
recorded from 2004, this study employs indirect estimation of price effects that incorporate the 
optimization conditions of firm behavior.  
  Demand 
In a discrete choice framework, consumers are assumed to purchase one unit among alternatives 
that  gives  the  maximum  utility  and  ties  are  assumed  to  occur  with  zero  probability.    For 
simplicity, this model defines the set of alternatives as one package of different milk products 
within the cross section.  The model does not consider multiple purchases in the same week or 9 
 
multiple trips
2 over the given year mainly to avoid complicated modeling and computations.  
While these issues
3 can be taken into account as an extension, each purchase is modeled as an 
independent event because the main concern of this paper is which factor has more of an impact 
on an individual’s choice of milk products rather than how many products (or how often the 
products) are purchased by an individual.  In addition, unlike the products in other industries, 
dairy products are perishable so that it is not likely that a household would purchase a large 
number  of  products  in  each  trip.    Thus,  the  single  unit  purchase  assumption  is  reasonable 
although multiple purchases in the same week are still observed from the data
4.  Finally, it is also 
assumed that the model is conditional on the occasions when the consumers choose a type of 
milk product from the choice set.  The model does not allow the possibility of not buying a milk 
product and probabilistic demand derived in the following section is conditional on participation 
in milk consumption.  The utility obtained from purchasing a milk product in a Random Utility 
Maximization (RUM) framework is given by 
??? = ???? + 𝑍???𝜃 + ?? 𝑦? − ???  + ?? + ???,                                                                (1)     
where ?? is a vector of observable attributes of alternative j; 𝑍?  is a vector of observed attributes 
of household i; 𝑦? is the income of household i;  ??? is the price household i faces in choosing j; 
?? and ?? are  random  coefficients  that  vary  over  consumers; ??  is  unobservable  attributes  of 
alternative j; ??? is an idiosyncratic source of utility for household i at choice j.   
Equation (1) implies that the level of utility attained by alternative j is a function of the attributes 
of the alternative, consumer characteristics, and the economic variables that determine the budget 
constraint:  income and price.  ??? is  defined as  price per  gallon and 𝑦? is  defined as  income 
allocated  to  gallon  milk  purchase.  The  term  (𝑦? − ???) represents  the  money  left  over  for 
household  i  associated  with  the  purchase  of  choice  j  and  the  coefficient ??  represents  the 
                                                           
2 For simplicity in this study, the repeated trips by the same households are considered as the purchases of 
different households with same demographics taking cross-sectional approach. 
3 Dube (2005) accommodates assortment decisions of soft drink purchase following Hendel’s (1999) multiple 
discreteness model.  He derives the expected aggregate demand for each individual household where the 
consumption points and the shopping points are assumed not to coincide and consumers are assumed to purchase 
the aggregate amount of consumptions anticipated at the point of shopping.   
4 Detailed numbers are given in the data section. 10 
 
marginal utility of income.  The price varies across items and across individuals because the 
prices for the same item are different depending on which store the consumer purchased the 
product  and  whether  he/she  used  discount  coupon  or  a  membership  card
5.    The impacts of 
expenditure purchasing item j, ??, are specified to vary over individuals in order to avoid IIA 
restrictions and the mixing distribution is specified with a lognormal distribution to impose a 
downward sloping demand curve. 
Heterogeneous consumer tastes on the product characteristics are accounted for in the model 
both  systematically  and  randomly.    The  systematic  (observed)  consumer  preferences  can  be 
captured by the interaction terms of observed consumer characteristics and alternative attributes.   
θ is a vector of parameters on the interaction terms and it represents the preferences of different 
types  of  consumers  on  the  product  characteristics.    The  random  (unobserved)  consumer 
preferences can be accounted for by allowing the coefficients of product characteristics to vary 
across decision makers with density a function ?(?).  Thus, the random coefficients ?? capture 
the remaining taste variations that cannot be explicitly linked with individual’s demographic 
characteristics.  Following the convention of mixed logit applications, ?(?) is specified with a 
normal distribution and the random utility can be rewritten as 
    ??? = ???  + ??𝜎?? + 𝑍???𝜃 + ?? 𝑦? − ???  + ?? + ???                                                           (2) 
where ?  and σ are the mean and the standard deviation, respectively, of the normal distribution 
to be estimated.  Observed product characteristics include fat content, organic claim and the 
package size of milk product.  Observed consumer characteristics include family size, the age 
and education of head and income of family.     
There may be additional factors related to the product attributes that are difficult to quantify or 
unobserved  by  the  researcher  but  are  frequent  determinants  of  demand.    These  unknown 
alternative characteristics are captured in ?? .  Including this term is important in the sense that 
its absence will produce inconsistent parameter estimates.  Berry (1994) argues that ignoring the 
                                                           
5 Price data are recorded by each consumer with hand-held scanner at home rather than collected from 
supermarket counter.  Different consumers can purchase the same items at different prices depending on which 
store or branch they purchase at.  11 
 
unobserved  characteristics  will  cause  severe  price  endogeneity  because  the  unobserved 
characteristics which are included in the error term are correlated with price.  Murdock (2006) 
finds  that  failing  to  address  unobserved  characteristics  causes  welfare  estimates  for 
improvements to be biased.  Her Monte Carlo simulations show that parameter estimates are less 
efficient and standard errors are biased.  
The probability that the household i chooses alternative j can be derived following McFadden 
(1974). 
??? = ????  ??? ?  + ??? >  ??? ?  + ??? ∀ ? ≠ ?   
      = ????(??? < ??? + ??? ?  − ??? ?   ∀ ? ≠ ?)                                                                     
(3)     
where  ??? ?  = ???  + ??𝜎?? + 𝑍???𝜃 − ????? + ??  and ? is  a  vector  of  random  and  fixed 
coefficients. 
Assuming the independently identically distributed extreme values for the idiosyncratic error 
term, ???, the choice probabilities of random coefficient model are the integrals of standard logit 
probabilities over a density of parameters; 
??? =  ???(?) ? ? ??,                                                                                                     (4) 
where  
??? =
exp ??? ?  
  exp ??? ?  
?
?=1
  and ?(?) is the probability density function of mixing distributions.                                                                                                          
Given the mixing distributions, the choice probability can be written; 
??? =  
exp ??? ?  
  exp ??? ?  
?
?=1
 ? ?|?,? ??                                                                               (5) 12 
 
where  the  lognormal  density  is  assigned  for ? ?|?,?  of  price  coefficient  and  the  normal 
distribution is assigned for the parameters of other characteristics.  b and W are the vectors of 
mean and covariance to be estimated.   
Supply and Equilibrium 
The marginal cost of each product is assumed to be constant before and after introduction of 
organic milk.  The milk processing industry is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and its 
marginal cost assumed to be constant.  Finally, supermarkets set retail prices as a fixed markup 
over the wholesale prices of the corresponding products.  
Suppose there are F multiproduct firms competing in the market and each of them produces Jf 
items where  Jf ∈ J is a subset of j=1,2,…, J products.  Then the profit that an individual firm f 
expects from producing  Jf products can be presented as follows: 
𝗱? = ?   ?? − ??? ??(?,?;𝜃)
?∈??
+ 𝐶? 
where M is the market size, mcj is the constant marginal cost of product j, Cf is the fixed cost, pj 
is the price of product j, sj(p,X;θ) is the market share of product j and qj p,X;θ  = Msj(p,X;θ). 
The first order conditions for static price competition are given by  




This set of J equations implies that the price of single product is determined at the equilibrium 
where each multi-product firm maximizes its profits from all products produced within the firm. 
In vector notation, the equations above can be presented as follow. 
?(?) + 𝗺 ? − ??  = 0                                                                                                                (6) 
where s(p), p and mc are Jx1 vectors of market shares, prices and marginal costs. ʩ is a JxJ 
matrix with ʩjr = ʩjr
∗ ∗ Sjr,  Srj = ∂sr ∂pj   ,j,r = 1,…,J and ʩjr
∗  is defined as  13 
 
  𝗺??
∗ =  
1, ?? ∃?: ?,?  ⊂ ??
0, ??ℎ??𝑤???
  
This matrix is called the ownership matrix which implies competition and ownership structure 
among the brands and firms.   The definition given above implies that firms maximize their 
profits from all the brands they produce.  If the firms separately maximize their profits from 
single brands no matter how many brands of milk each firm produces, the ownership matrix 
should be defined with an identity matrix.  If the firms collude in price, all the elements of the 
matrix should be ones.  
Equation (6) can be rewritten as below to infer the unknown marginal costs for each firm.  Given 
the equilibrium prices and demand estimates, marginal costs can be obtained by solving Equation 
(7) for marginal costs.  
?? = ? + 𝗺−1?(?)                                                                                                         (7) 
The new equilibrium prices when there is no organic milk in the market can be estimated by 
solving  the  set  of  markup  equations  in  Equation  (6)  using  the  marginal  costs  obtained  in 
Equation (7) and a new ownership matrix where organic milk is removed.  The dimension of the 
new matrix is (J-1)x(J-1) in this application since the number of new product is one.  The new 
equilibrium prices hold under the assumption that the marginal costs do not change before and 
after introduction of organic milk.  
IV.  Data and Estimation 
Data 
AC Nielsen Homescan panel data are used for the estimation.  The sample is selected among 
volunteers based on both demographic and geographic targets.  Stratification is done by AC 
Nielsen to ensure that the sample matches the U.S. Census.  The nationally representative sample 
consists  of  purchase  histories  of  milk  products  at  the  Universal  Product  Code  (UPC)  level 
including price paid for the item, product characteristics and demographic information.  The 14 
 
recorded price data for the same item may vary across households depending on the type of 
outlet,  store  location  or  whether  the  coupon/discount  is  applied  or  not.    In  addition  to  the 
characteristics  variables,  brief  descriptions  on  each  UPC  are  provided  so  that  additional 
information on the products can be obtained.  
For this study, weekly data in 2005 are collected.  The unit of the item to be analyzed is defined 
with UPCs in order to examine the market at a very disaggregated level.  UPC is the smallest 
unit of product that identifies the manufacturer and the category of the item.  According to the 
dataset, there exist approximately 7,000 different UPCs in the nation in 2005.  One thing notable 
about the dairy industry is that the market is fairly localized so that specific brands of milk only 
appear in specific regions although there exist, of course, some national brands.  Thus, focusing 
on a specific regional market is inevitable in order to analyze milk product at the disaggregate 
level of industry.  Some of metropolitan areas in North Carolina, which include Raleigh, Durham, 
Chapel-Hill (RDU) and Charlotte, are chosen for the study.  Another point to note about the 
dairy industry is that the market is dominated by a few suppliers and supermarket brand products 
have the largest market shares.  Although a specific regional market is selected for the study, 
there exist 600 UPCs and 86 brands in this market.  It is difficult to manage the whole list of 
UPCs so top items with larger than 0.8% market shares are selected.  As a result, this paper 
analyzes 39 items defined by UPCs, and the total market share of these 39 items is about 65% of 
milk sales.  An interesting point is that 34 items out of 39 are private labeled milk products that 
account for 56%
6 of the market share.   
50 UPCs among the 600 UPCs and 6 brands among the 86 brands fall into the organic category 
and each of UPCs in organic category takes on average less than 0.1% of the milk market.  Thus, 
the organic products are aggregated across UPCs and considered as one product that is assumed 
to be produced by a single firm, Dean Food, the largest milk process company in the nation, 
because the company leads the organic milk market by taking more than 70 percent of market 
share among the organic milk brands.
 7   In this way, the welfare analysis does not need to 
                                                           
6 The market share for private labeled milk will be even larger if it considers the products not included in 39 items.   
7 Only the organic products in half gallon packages are included in the estimation because the gallon size products 
take only 0.17% of the market share while the half gallon take about 4% of the market share.  Gallon size products 15 
 
consider path dependence in which the order of introduction of each organic milk product affects 
the welfare estimate.   The aggregate market share of the top selling items and combined organic 
products is about 70% and organic alone takes 4% of the market share.  In order to represent the 
whole market, an outside good is defined.  The rest of the products that account about for 30% of 
the market are aggregated and considered as one product called the “outside good”.  The items in 
the  outside  goods  are  assumed  to  be  homogeneous.    The  mean  values  are  used  for  the 
characteristics  variables,  but  prices  are  left  to  vary  because  they  vary  across  consumers.  
Therefore, 41 items are considered for the analysis and the individual unit of analysis is the 
individual household’s probability of choosing each item defined here.  A set of price data for 
the products that household i does not purchase is also created to compute the logit formula 
defined in Equation (4).  If the item is purchased by other consumers in the same store of the 
same region in the same week, the average of the prices sold in the same store of the region in 
that week is used for the items not purchased by household i.  If there is no record of sales for the 
item in the same store of the region in the same week, the average price of the same store of 
other regions in the same week is used.  Finally, multiple purchases from the same trip are split 
into multiple shopping trips because this paper assumes each purchase is an independent event.  
The total number of purchases observed from the data is 38,689 purchases.  Table 1 shows the 
ownership relations and market shares of milk brands. Table 2 shows summary statistics of the 
41 items considered in the model.  Table 3 summarizes demographic information.  
Retailer and Manufacturer Relation  
Note that the price data used here reflect retail prices while this paper analyzes manufacturers’ 
behavior.  As  described  in  section  II,  raw  milk  is  produced  by  dairy  farmers  and  sold  to 
processors  usually  through  cooperatives  as  middle  men.    The  milk  products  that  consumers 
purchase are processed through pasteurization and homogenization, bottled and distributed by 
processors.  There usually is another level of distribution between consumers and processors in 
the milk industry, which can be represented by retail stores, such as convenient stores, grocery 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
are not aggregated with the half gallon because it is considered that the prices are affected by package size and 
combining different size of organic milk might cause different estimation results. 16 
 
stores and supermarkets
8.  Since the data observed are retail prices rather than wholesale prices 
that  milk  processors  receive ,  and  because  this  study  excludes  direct  transactions  between 
processors and  commercial consumers, an additional assumption is necessary for the profit 
equations of manufacturers described in Equation (2) to hold.  Following the convention in many 
of empirical Industrial Organization papers, I assume that retailers set price as a fixed markup or 
a constant margin over the corresponding wholesale price.   Hausman and Leonard (2002) show 
that retail prices and retail demand elasticities can be used for the first order conditions of 
manufacturers under the assumption of constant margin   or markup.    Suppose that w is the 
wholesale price that processors receive and grocery stores charge b over w.   Then the profit of 
milk processors is: 
𝗱 =  𝑤 − ? ?(𝑤 + ?) 
The first order conditions are 
?𝗱 ?𝑤   = ? 𝑤 + ?  +  𝑤 − ? ?? 𝑤 + ?  ?𝑤   = 0 
or 
? ?  +  ? − (? + ?)) ?? ?  ??   = 0 
Therefore, by redefining manufacturers’ marginal costs to be c+b in the constant margin case and 
c(1+b) in the constant markup case, retail prices can be used instead of wholesale prices.  
The study on brand competition among saline crackers by Slade (1995) gives a rationale for the 
assumption of non competitive pricing strategy of grocery stores
9. She interviewed grocery-chain 
marketing managers and found that most households shop at the same store each week and their 
choice of store is determined by location and the quality of the store rather than the pricing 
                                                           
8 Milk products can be distributed through both processors and retailers. Households purchase milk from retail 
stores, such as convenient store, supermarket, conventional grocery store and gourmet food store, but 
commercial customers, such as schools and restaurants, usually purchase directly from the manufacturers. The 
data obtained for this study reflect the prices at retail outlets. 
9 This does not mean that grocery stores fail to compete. Their competition is more through overall pricing policies, 
freshness of produce, consumer service, etc rather than through individual items. 17 
 
policies of the store. Therefore, she finds it is reasonable to assume that competition is among 
brands within a store.  
Demand   
This section describes the procedure used for estimating the parameters in Equation (2).  First, 
the terms in Equation (2) that only vary across alternatives are combined into one term following 
Murdock (2006).  The alternative specific constant ?? represents both observed and unobserved 
product characteristics as shown in Equation (9). 
??? = ??𝜎?? + 𝑍???𝜃 − ????? + ?? + ???,                                                                                     (8) 
?? = ???  + ??.                                                                                                                              (9) 
In the first step of the estimation, coefficients in Equation (8), along with alternative constants ??, 
are  estimated.  In  the  second  step,  the  vector ?  in  Equation  (9)  can  also  be  estimated  by 
regressing  the  estimated  alternative  specific  constants  from  Equation  (8)  on  the  product 
characteristics variables with the OLS estimator.   
Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimator (MSLE) is used to estimate the random and fixed 
coefficients in Equation (8).  First, the choice probabilities in Equation (5), where the expected 
utility is defined with a full set of alternative specific constants as explained in this section, are 
approximated by simulation.  Random numbers are drawn by Halton
10 sequences and inverted  
into  the  numbers  drawn  from  the  each  distribution
11 assigned  for  the  parameters  by  the 
researcher. In each iteration, the logit formula  ??? ??  is calculated with each draw and any 
given value for the parameters. The simulated probabilities are obtained by averaging the logit 
formula: 
? ??   =
1
?  ??? ??  ?
?=1                                                                                                                     (10) 
                                                           
10 50 random numbers are drawn for each individual.  
11 The taste variations ?? are specified to be drawn from standard normal distribution, and the random parts of the 
parameter on price are specified to be drawn from log normal distribution with log(mean)=m and log(standard 
deviation)=s.    18 
 
where R is the number of draws.  Then the simulated probabilities are inserted into the log-
likelihood function to find a simulated log-likelihood: 
??? =     ????? ? ??   ?
?=1
?
?=1                                                                                                            (11) 
where  ??? is an indicator variable that has value 1 if individual i chooses alternative j, otherwise 
0.  The MSLE is the value of parameters that maximizes SLL.  The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (BFGS) Quasi-Newton method is used for searching the maximum numerically.  
Elasticities 
Mixed logit does not exhibit independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) or the restrictive 
substitution patterns of logit.  The ratio of mixed logit probabilities depends on all the data since 
the denominators of logit formula are inside the integral so that do not cancel.  The own price 
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where  ?? is the m-th element of vector ?, the coefficient of price, and  Xij
m is the m-th element 
of vector Xij, which is the price variable in this model.  ??? is the probability that household i 
chooses alternative j.  
Welfare Analysis 
With the logit assumptions, the consumer surplus associated with a given set of alternatives has a 
closed form and is easy to calculate.  Denote 𝐶?? =
1
??
 max ???, ∀?   as the consumer surplus 
for household i, where ?? is the marginal utility of income of household i.  
???
?𝑦?
= ??, with 𝑦? the 
income of household i.  The division by ?? translates utility into dollars.  Since the researcher 19 
 
cannot observe ??? but ???,  the researcher is able to calculate the expected consumer surplus  as 
𝐸 𝐶??  =
1
??
E[max ??? + ???∀? ], where the expectation is over all possible values of ??.  Small 
and Rosen (1981) shows that, if each error ??? is i.i.d. type I extreme value and utility is linear in 
income, the expected consumer surplus can be derived as: 
𝐸 𝐶??  = 1/??ln[  exp(???)]
?
?=1 + 𝐶                                                                                      (14) 
where C is an unknown constant.  Therefore, when the choice set for the consumers change from 
the observed scenario (post introduction of organic milk) to the counterfactual scenario (without 
organic choices), the change in expected consumer welfare for household i is 
𝐶?? = ∆? =
1
??
 ln[  exp(???
𝑤 ?1 )]
?
?=1 − ln[  exp(???
𝑤? ?0 )]
?−1
?=1                                 (15) 
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?=1                                                 (16) 
where Vij = Xjβ   + Xjσui + ZiXjθ + γi yi − pij  + ωj, Vij
wis  the  indirect  utility  evaluated  with 
organic milk, Vij
wo is the indirect utility evaluated without organic milk, p1is the vector of prices 
of all items after organic milk is introduced into the market, p1
e is the vector of conventional milk 
prices at the original equilibrium and  p0 is the vector of counterfactual prices of conventional 
milk when organic milk is not introduced into the market.  The first bracket presents the variety 
effects and the second part measures the price effects.  
The marginal utility of income αi is approximated by γi in Equation (2) for welfare estimation in 
this study.  It is notable that ωj plays an important role in welfare estimation.  If the new product 
has desirable unobserved characteristics, excluding this term will lead the welfare effects to be 
underestimated because Vij
w will not take the positive characteristics into account.  On the other 20 
 
hand,  the  welfare  effects  will  be  overestimated  if  the  undesirable  unobserved  product 
characteristics are ignored. 
As described in the previous section, p0 is estimated by reverse engineering firm behavior under 
the Bertrand-Nash competition.  Since the data for marginal costs, such as raw milk price paid to 
dairy farmers and bottling costs, are not available at the individual firm/processor level, marginal 
costs are inferred by solving Equation (7) using the ownership matrix with organic milk brand.  
The derivative terms in Equation (6) are computed with the elasticity estimates from the demand 
analysis.  Counterfactual prices are evaluated using the ownership matrix without organic milk.  
Equation (6) is solved for prices utilizing the estimated marginal costs under the assumption that 
marginal costs do not change over the time when organic milk is introduced and not introduced 
yet.  Marginal costs and counterfactual prices are evaluated for each city in each week since it is 
detected that the same items in different cities are sold at different prices and the price varies by 
week.  Two cities, Charlotte and RDU (Raleigh-Durham-ChapelHill) are identified from the 
dataset.  
V.  Results 
Parameter Estimates 
The  econometric  approach  outlined  above  is  applied  to  the  A.C.  Nielsen  Homescan  data  to 
estimate the probabilistic demand equations at the disaggregate level of industry.  A variety of 
starting values are attempted in estimation and the model converged to the same values in each 
attempt.  
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for Equation (8) and (9).  The random coefficient  ?? is 
assumed to follow a lognormal distribution in which the log of  ?? is normally distributed.  I 
parameterize the lognormal distribution in terms of the underlying normal.  In other words, I 
estimate parameters m and s which are the mean and variance of the log of the coefficient. Then 
the mean and variance of ?? are derived from the estimates of m and s.  The median is exp(m), 
the mean is exp(m+s/2), and the variance is exp(sm+2)[exp(s)-1].  The point estimates of m and 21 
 
s, which are -0.67 and 0.0016 respectively, imply that the coefficient  ?? has the mean, median 
and variance of 0.51, 0.51, and 0.009 respectively as shown in Table4.  In other words, the 
average of marginal utility of income in this sample is 0.51 and its standard deviation is 0.095.   
The  interaction  terms  of  product  and  demographic  characteristics  have  the  expected  signs. 
Households  with  higher  income  or/and  higher  education  value  organic  milk  more  than 
households with lower income or/and lower education do. However, the results indicate that 
households with older heads do not value the organic characteristic as much as the ones with 
younger heads.  Note that the parameter estimates of product characteristics alone do not provide 
any implication on the overall impact of the attributes.  The overall impact of organic factors on 
utility is calculated using the mean and median values of demographic characteristics given in 
Table3 and it is found that average households prefer organic milk to conventional milk.  The 
overall impact of fat content also can be interpreted in the same manner.   Households with 
average demographic characteristics prefer lower fat milk to higher fat milk.  
Elasticities for each consumer are computed following the Equation (12) and (13).  Table 5 
presents the median of own and cross price elasticities of the consumers in the sample.  Own 
price elasticities are ranged from -2.6 to -1.4, which are reasonable compared to the estimates in 
other studies in milk demand.  For example, Dhar and Foltz (2005) find own price elasticities 
between -4.4 and -1.04, and Alviola (2010) finds between -2.0 and -0.87.   
Cross price elasticities are all positive as expected.  In the discrete choice model, cross price 
elasticities are positive as long as the parameter estimates of price is negative because all the 
variables in cross price elasticities are in a form of exponential function, thus the parameter 
estimates of price solely determine the sign of cross price elasticities.  Therefore, organic milk 
and conventional milk are always substitutes to each other in this study unlike the findings from 
the aggregate demand in the previous chapter.  This can be a very restrictive property in some 
applications, but it is intuitively sound in this application because one type of milk is usually 
thought to be a substitute for other types of milk product at the UPC level rather than to be a 
complement.  Of course different milk products can be complements for some households, but 
this model rules out those cases.  Although this study cannot test whether two products are 
complements, cross price elasticities provide implications on the strength of substitution patterns.  22 
 
For example, the conventional milk is more substitutable for organic milk than what organic 
milk is substitutable for conventional milk.  In addition, consumers tend to switch to the same 
package size milk products when there is an increase in the price of one good.  Unlike the 
previous chapter, fat content and the labels of products do not determine substitution patterns in 
this model.  Although some of the cross price elasticities in Table 5 look the same for the same 
sized products, it is hard to say that the model presents IIA property because they differ in higher 
decimal points (6
th decimal point) and the ratio of the largest elasticity to the smallest one is 
between 3 and 5.  
Following Wold and Jureen (1953), group elasticities are also computed by taking weighted 
average where the weights are the market shares of each item in the group.  The group cross-
price elasticities shown in Table 6 also indicate the substitutability among the same size products.  
This result is consistent with the findings in the other studies in the demand for soft drinks at the 
UPC level.  Although there is no previous study in milk demand at the UPC level, some studies 
in soft drinks, such as Guadagni and Little (1983) and Dube (2005), show that households tend to 
switch among products of the same package size.            
Variety Effect 
The variety effects (VE) are computed by subtracting the counterfactual indirect utility in which 
consumers  do  not  have  organic  option  from  the  actual  indirect  utility.    Indirect  utility  is 
transformed into dollar terms dividing by the marginal utility of income estimated from random 
coefficient logit.  The estimated total amount that consumers are willing to pay for the organic 
option is $4595.4 in this sample.  This is equivalent to 4% of the total milk expenditure in the 
sample.  Demographic distributions of welfare effects are shown in Table 7 ~ Table 12. Each 
table  presents  the  distribution  of  average  variety  effects  of  demographic  groups.    This 
information would be very useful in the sense that it provides insight into the characteristics that 
differentiate the potential organic household from the potential conventional household.   
Household income and education of the head of the household seem to be associated with the 
valuation of organic milk.  The results indicate that the households with higher income value the 
organic  milk  more  than  the  households  with  lower  income  do  in  general.    The  results  also 23 
 
indicate that the households headed by someone with higher education appreciate the organic 
milk more than the ones with lower education.  This could be because income and education are 
correlated, and higher education probably enhances the understanding of organic process of dairy 
produce and its impact on environment.  Or this might be because the marginal utility of income 
is larger for low income households than for higher income households and the welfares in dollar 
term are smaller for lower income households since the welfare numbers are the utility divided 
by marginal utility of income.    
The age of head in a household also seems to be a factor that distinguishes the consumer who 
values organic milk.  Table 7 shows that households with an older head appreciate organic option 
less than the ones with younger heads.  The results imply that households with a head between 
25  and  29  years  old  benefit  the  most  from  organic  milk.    Households  headed  by  someone 
between 30 and 34 years old are ranked next.  This can be explained by the fact that younger 
people  have  a  tendency  to  accept  new  products  more  easily  than  older  people.    However, 
households with a head younger than 25 years old do not value organic milk as much as the 
others.  This might be because consumers in this category do not earn income as much as older 
ones who are more experienced.  
The presence of child does not have the expected effect.  According to the results, consumers 
without a child benefit more from organic milk than ones with children although it is expected 
that  young  mothers  tend  to  want  organic  milk  for  their  children.    However,  among  the 
households with children, welfare is greater as the age of child is smaller.  
Although it is impossible to compare directly with other studies because there are no welfare 
studies on organic milk at the household level, the welfare distributions in this study are similar 
to the distributions of demand for organic milk at the household level.  For example, according to 
Dimitri and Venezia (2007) households with higher education and income are more likely to 
purchase organic milk.  Alviola and Capps (2010) also find that income and education play an 
important  role  in  organic  milk  purchase  while  the  presence  of  children  does  not  affect  the 
organic purchases.     24 
 
Although  the  distributions  of  welfare  effects  present  similar  implications  as  the  parameter 
estimates,  it  should  be  noted  that  each  demographic  variable  in  the  distribution  cannot  be 
interpreted as  a ceteris paribus factor that determines  the amount of welfare effects  of each 
individual  while  the  demographic  variable  in  utility  function  is  a  factor  that  determines  the  
utility holding other variables constant.  In other words, each distribution is estimated without 
controlling  other  demographic  characteristics.  Thus,  the  distribution  depends  on  the  set  of 
demographic characteristics for each individual.  
Price Effect 
Utilizing  the  estimated  marginal  costs,  the  first  order  conditions  are  solved  again  for  the 
counterfactual prices of conventional milk when organic milk is not introduced.  Table 13 and 
Table 14 present the median current and counterfactual prices in Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham-
ChapelHill (RDU), respectively.  The last columns of the tables indicate that overall milk prices 
are  decreased  after  the  organic  milk  introduction.    This  can  be  interpreted  as  increased 
competition in the market due to the new product.  The average change is larger in RDU than in 
Charlotte, and the number of items whose prices are decreased is larger in RDU. Pricing policies 
on individual items are mixed across the cities and the firms.  For example, firm A lowered the 
prices of most items that it sells in Charlotte but raised the prices in RDU after the organic 
introduction.  On the other hand, firm B and firm C raised the prices for most of its items sold in 
Charlotte while they decreased prices in RDU. Firm F, which is the firm introduced organic milk, 
also shows different pricing strategies in two cities.  It lowered the prices of items sold in RDU, 
but raised the prices in Charlotte.  The pricing strategy in Charlotte shows cannibalization effects 
in which the new product introducer raises the prices of existing brands to promote the sales of 
new product.  However, note that firm F decreased the price of the most popular brand among its 
brands
12. 
The price effect that is the  second part of the  Equation (16) is evaluated with the estimated 
counterfactual prices.  The results imply that non-organic purchasers in this region benefit about 
$4,048 from the enhanced competition in fluid milk market.  This is equivalent to 3.47% of milk 
expenditure in this data set.  Together with the variety effect whose estimate was $4,591 from the 
                                                           
12 Brand ID is assigned in the order of market share. 25 
 
previous chapter, total consumer welfare translated is $8,639 and it is 7.41% of the expenditure 
in this data set.  
This study does not provide the welfare analysis of manufacturers, but some intuitions can be 
gained by observing the changes in individual firms’ margins.  Table 15 and Table 16 report the 
estimated  marginal  costs  and  the  margins  of  individual  items  sold  in  Charlotte  and  RDU, 
respectively.  The post-introduction margins indicate that fluid milk is a high profit industry with 
the average margins of 57% in RDU and 62% in Charlotte.  The estimated margins seem realistic 
given that the average conventional milk price is about $3.6 per gallon and the wholesale price is 
about $14.4 per cwt, which is equivalent to $1.2 per gallon.  It is notable that the price-cost 
margin of organic milk is less than the industry average.  Some brands produced by firm F and 
firm C are ranked as highest margins independent from the existence of organic milk.  The 
estimated marginal costs are larger and the price-cost margins are smaller in Charlotte than in 
RDU, but  it does  not  necessarily mean that firms  make less profit in Charlotte because the 
quantity  sold  is  larger  in  Charlotte.    The  last  columns  of  the  table  indicates  that,  upon 
introduction of organic milk, the margins of conventional milk brands decreased in both cities 
although the changes are greater in RDU than in Charlotte.  Decreased margins imply that the 
prices are decreased while marginal costs are constant regardless of whether organic milk is sold.  
However, the decrease in margins does not mean that profits are reduced since the quantity 
changes after the introduction of organic milk are not known.    
VI.  Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to investigate individual households’ welfare improvement from 
organic milk introduction in the partial equilibrium framework.  Welfare studies with individual 
household level data can yield more information than studies with aggregate level data because 
one  can  estimate  the  distributions  of  welfare  effects  according  to  consumers’  demographic 
characteristics.    The  decomposed  welfare  measurements,  price  effects  and  variety  effects, 
provide comprehensive understanding in the sources of consumer benefits. 26 
 
The demands for milk products are estimated for each individual household by adopting discrete 
choice approach.  In order to take both observed and unobserved heterogeneous preferences, 
random  coefficient  logit  model  is  specified  for  each  household’s  probability  to  choose  an 
alternative.    Parametric  distributions  for  the  random  coefficients  are  estimated.    The  results 
indicate that consumers with higher income and education are more likely to purchase organic 
product, but less likely to buy higher fat milk.  It is also found that the households with elder 
heads are more likely to prefer higher fat milk and conventional milk.  Cross price elasticities 
show  that  conventional  milk  is  more  substitutable  to  organic  milk  than  organic  milk  is 
substitutable  for  conventional  milk.    Cross  price  elasticities  also  indicate  the  substitutability 
among the same package size products.  The variety effects are computed for each individual 
whose distributions yield similar implications as the parameter estimates and total measure takes 
approximately 4% of total milk expenditure in the sample.   Finally, the benefits  from  price 
changes in conventional milk prices are quantified.  The supply-side approach is incorporated 
with price sensitivity from the demand analysis to approximate the equilibrium in the fluid milk 
market.  Marginal costs are estimated assuming that multiproduct firms compete in a Bertrand-
Nash fashion where the firms choose prices to maximize profits.  
The mixed logit model employed for this study is well known for its competence in modeling 
individual economic behavior.  The model has the advantage that it requires substantially fewer 
parameters to be estimated than a typical flexible functional form such as Almost Ideal Demand 
System  requires.    Thus,  the  number  of  alternatives  that  a  system  of  demand  equations  can 
accommodate in the choice set is not limited in this model, and qualitative variables such as 
demographic characteristics can also be included in the model as many as desired.  Secondly, the 
number  of  zero  observations,  which  a  researcher  frequently  encounters  when  s/he  estimates 
demand equations with disaggregate level data, is relatively small while a lot of zero purchases 
occur in the estimation of flexible demand functions because the functions are generally in the 
form  of  share  equations.    Modeling  the  zero  purchasing  behavior  can  be  computationally 
cumbersome because it requires the integrals of multivariate density function.  In addition, the 
model satisfies the restrictions of consumer demand theory, does not hold IIA properties, and is 
flexible enough to approximate any RUM consistent choice probabilities.  However, it is worth 
to mention the limitations of this model for other applications.  Although the model yields more 27 
 
flexible cross price elasticities than the standard logit model, it still imposes certain degree of 
restrictions  on  the  substitution  patterns  compared  with  the  conventional  flexible  demand 
functions. In addition, this study assumes that consumers choose only one alternative on each 
shopping trip for computational simplicity as mentioned above.  This assumption can be very 
restrictive in the applications of highly storable goods market such as wine and soft drinks, and 
one will face difficulties when s/he models multiple choices.  Finally, the linear dependence of 
systematic utility on economic variables makes this model quite restrictive.  
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<Table 1 Description of Items> 
item  market 
share  brand  Firm  organic  Size  fat 
1  4.2  private label  Food Lion  0  1  2 
2  4.0  Composite Product of 
Organic  Dean Food  1  2  . 
3  3.3  private label  Harris Teeter  0  1  0 
4  2.8  private label  Food Lion  0  1  3 
5  2.8  private label  Food Lion  0  1  0 
6  2.8  private label  Wal Mart  0  1  2 
7  2.4  private label  Food Lion  0  2  2 
8  2.2  private label  Harris Teeter  0  2  2 
9  2.3  private label  Wal Mart  0  1  0 
10  2.0  private label  Food Lion  0  2  3 
11  2.0  private label  Friendly Farms  0  1  2 
12  2.0  private label  Bi-Lo  0  1  2 
13  1.8  private label  Food Lion  0  1  1 
14  1.8  private label  Wal Mart  0  1  3 
15  1.7  private label  Harris Teeter  0  1  2 
16  1.7  PET  Dean Food  0  1  3 
17  1.8  private label  Friendly Farms  0  1  0 
18  2.4  Country Fresh  Dean Food  0  1  0 
19  1.6  private label  Harris Teeter  0  2  0 
20  2.1  Country Fresh  Dean Food  0  1  2 
21  1.6  private label  Harris Teeter  0  1  1 
22  1.5  private label  Bi-Lo  0  1  0 
23  1.4  private label  Wal Mart  0  1  1 
24  1.2  private label  Bi-Lo  0  1  3 
25  1.1  private label  Food Lion  0  2  1 
26  1.1  private label  Food Lion  0  2  0 
27  1.1  PET  Dean Food  0  1  2 
28  1.0  private label  Bi-Lo  0  2  2 
29  0.9  private label  Wal Mart  0  2  0 
30  0.9  private label  Harris Teeter  0  2  3 
31  0.9  private label  Lowes  0  1  2 
32  0.9  private label  Wal Mart  0  2  2 
33  1.0  private label  Friendly Farms  0  1  3 
34  1.3  private label  Dean Food  0  1  3 
35  0.9  private label  Harris Teeter  0  2  1 
36  0.9  private label  Lowes  0  1  3 
37  1.0  private label  Lowes  0  1  1 
38  0.9  private label  Harris Teeter  0  1  1 
39  1.0  private label  Lowes  0  1  0 
40  0.7  private label  Wal Mart  0  2  3 
41  31.2  outside goods  .  0  1.5  1.6 
all of organic milk products are included in item2. Fat contents vary within item 2. Size1=Gallon, Size2=Half Gallon. 
fat 0=fat free, 1=1% low fat, 2= 2% reduced fat, 3=whole milk, 2.3=soy milk 
values for item 41(outside goods) are mean values 31 
 
<Table2 Market Share by Product Attributes> 
    Market Share 
size 
Gallon  49.0 
Half Gallon  19.8 
outside  31.2 
fat 
Fat Free  18.7 
Low Fat  8.6 
Reduced Fat  23.2 
Whole milk  18.2 
outside  31.2 
 
<Table 3 Demographic Description> 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max  Median 
Income  10.7  0.6  8.5  11.5  10.8 
Education  4.1  1.1  1.0  6.0  4.0 
Age of Head  5.0  0.9  2.5  6.0  5.2 
Household Size  2.6  1.3  1.0  9.0  2.0 
note: The values for income are the log of income 
Education 1= Grade School, 2=Some High School, 3= Graduate High School, 
4= Some College, 5= Graduated College, 6= Post College Grad 
Age of Head is divided by 10 
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<Table 4 Parameter Estimates> 
Variable  Parameter  Value  Standard Error 
income-price 
Mean of ln(coefficient)  -0.67***  0.08 
Std dev of ln(coefficient)  0.04***  0.05 
Mean of coefficient  0.51   
Median of coefficient  0.51   
Std dev of coefficient  0.095   
Fat 
Mean  1.08***  0.3 
std. dev.  -0.02  0.04 
fat*age  Coefficient  -0.04***  0.01 
fat*edu  Coefficient  -0.13***  0.01 
fat*income  Coefficient  -0.11***  0.01 
Organic 
Mean  -4.09*  2.48 
std. dev.  2.60  0.25 
organic*age  Coefficient  -0.16**  0.05 
organic*edu  Coefficient  1.06***  0.06 
organic*income  Coefficient  0.63***  0.08 
size 
Mean  -2.49***  0.42 
std. dev.  2.27  0.18 
size*family size  Coefficient  -0.52***  0.03 
  SLL at convergence  115959.09   
Note: values for price related parameters are estimated in the form of ln(coefficient). 
The estimates for size variables should be interpreted as an opposite direction since the values of size are 









<Table 5 Elasticity Estimates, Mean Values> 
Item        2  3  5  9  17  22  39 
  brand      Organic  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL 
    fat      FF  FF  FF  FF  FF  FF 
      size  2  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2  Organic    2  -2.029  0.027  0.022  0.014  0.011  0.011  0.008 
3  CTL  FF  1  0.042  -1.900  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
5  CTL  FF  1  0.042  0.081  -1.798  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
9  CTL  FF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  -1.477  0.033  0.031  0.023 
17  CTL  FF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  -1.424  0.031  0.023 
22  CTL  FF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  -1.604  0.023 
39  CTL  FF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  -1.859 
19  CTL  FF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
26  CTL  FF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
29  CTL  FF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
13  CTL  LF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
21  CTL  LF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
23  CTL  LF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
37  CTL  LF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
38  CTL  LF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
25  CTL  LF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
35  CTL  LF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
1  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
6  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
11  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
12  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
15  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
31  CTL  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
7  CTL  RF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
8  CTL  RF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
28  CTL  RF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
32  CTL  RF  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
4  CTL  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
14  CTL  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
24  CTL  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
33  CTL  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
36  CTL  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
10  CTL  WH  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
30  CTL  WH  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.009 
40  CTL  WH  2  0.119  0.031  0.025  0.017  0.013  0.012  0.009 
18  CNTY  FF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.034  0.031  0.023 
20  CNTY  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
27  PET  RF  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
16  PET  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
34  CNTY  WH  1  0.042  0.081  0.066  0.043  0.033  0.031  0.023 
41  Outside      0.079  0.055  0.045  0.029  0.023  0.021  0.016 34 
 
 
Item        19  26  29  13  21  23  37  38 
  Brand      CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL 
    fat    FF  FF  FF  LF  LF  LF  LF  LF 
      size  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1 
2  Organic    1  0.044  0.030  0.019  0.015  0.013  0.009  0.007  0.007 
3  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
5  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
9  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
17  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
22  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
39  CTL  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
19  CTL  FF  2  -2.570  0.056  0.035  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
26  CTL  FF  2  0.082  -2.496  0.035  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
29  CTL  FF  2  0.082  0.056  -1.763  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
13  CTL  LF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  -1.832  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
21  CTL  LF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  -1.954  0.028  0.023  0.023 
23  CTL  LF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  -1.505  0.023  0.023 
37  CTL  LF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  -1.801  0.023 
38  CTL  LF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  -1.983 
25  CTL  LF  2  0.082  0.056  0.035  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
35  CTL  LF  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
1  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
6  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
11  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
12  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
15  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
31  CTL  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
7  CTL  RF  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
8  CTL  RF  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
28  CTL  RF  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
32  CTL  RF  2  0.082  0.056  0.035  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
4  CTL  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
14  CTL  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
24  CTL  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
33  CTL  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
36  CTL  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
10  CTL  WH  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
30  CTL  WH  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
40  CTL  WH  2  0.082  0.056  0.034  0.017  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.009 
18  CNTY  FF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
20  CNTY  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
27  PET  RF  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
16  PET  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
34  CNTY  WH  1  0.018  0.012  0.008  0.044  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.023 
41  Outside      0.044  0.030  0.018  0.030  0.027  0.019  0.015  0.015 35 
 
 
item        25  35  1  6  11  12  15  31 
  brand      CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL 
    fat    LF  LF  RF  RF  RF  RF  RF  RF 
      size  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2  Organic    1  0.031  0.025  0.033  0.019  0.012  0.014  0.014  0.007 
3  CTL  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
5  CTL  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
9  CTL  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
17  CTL  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
22  CTL  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
39  CTL  FF  1    0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
19  CTL  FF  2  0.059  0.047  0.038  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
26  CTL  FF  2  0.059  0.047  0.038  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
29  CTL  FF  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
13  CTL  LF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
21  CTL  LF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
23  CTL  LF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
37  CTL  LF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
38  CTL  LF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.042  0.042  0.021 
25  CTL  LF  2  -2.517  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
35  CTL  LF  2  0.059  -2.627  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
1  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  -1.776  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
6  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  -1.592  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
11  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  -1.464  0.043  0.042  0.021 
12  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  -1.646  0.042  0.021 
15  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  -1.955  0.021 
31  CTL  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  -1.875 
7  CTL  RF  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
8  CTL  RF  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
28  CTL  RF  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
32  CTL  RF  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
4  CTL  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
14  CTL  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
24  CTL  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
33  CTL  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
36  CTL  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
10  CTL  WH  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
30  CTL  WH  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
40  CTL  WH  2  0.059  0.047  0.039  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.008 
18  CNTY  FF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
20  CNTY  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
27  PET  RF  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
16  PET  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
34  CNTY  WH  1  0.013  0.011  0.101  0.059  0.038  0.043  0.042  0.021 
41  Outside      0.031  0.025  0.068  0.040  0.026  0.029  0.029  0.014 36 
 
 
item        7  8  28  32  4  14  24  33  36 
  brand      CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL 
    fat    RF  RF  RF  RF  WH  WH  WH  WH  WH 
      size  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1 
2  Organic  .  1  0.067  0.057  0.024  0.019  0.021  0.012  0.008  0.006  0.006 
3  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
5  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
9  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
17  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
22  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
39  CTL  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
19  CTL  FF  2  0.130  0.109  0.045  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
26  CTL  FF  2  0.130  0.109  0.045  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
29  CTL  FF  2  0.130  0.109  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
13  CTL  LF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
21  CTL  LF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
23  CTL  LF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
37  CTL  LF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
38  CTL  LF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
25  CTL  LF  2  0.130  0.109  0.045  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
35  CTL  LF  2  0.130  0.109  0.045  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
1  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
6  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
11  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
12  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
15  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
31  CTL  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
7  CTL  RF  2  -2.443  0.109  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
8  CTL  RF  2  0.130  -2.525  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
28  CTL  RF  2  0.130  0.109  -2.193  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
32  CTL  RF  2  0.130  0.109  0.046  -1.975  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
4  CTL  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  -1.820  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
14  CTL  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  -1.658  0.025  0.018  0.020 
24  CTL  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  -1.740  0.018  0.020 
33  CTL  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  -1.528  0.020 
36  CTL  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  -1.900 
10  CTL  WH  2  0.130  0.109  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
30  CTL  WH  2  0.130  0.109  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
40  CTL  WH  2  0.130  0.109  0.046  0.036  0.025  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.008 
18  CNTY  FF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
20  CNTY  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
27  PET  RF  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
16  PET  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.018  0.020 
34  CNTY  WH  1  0.029  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.065  0.037  0.025  0.019  0.020 
41  Outside      0.069  0.058  0.024  0.019  0.044  0.025  0.017  0.012  0.013 37 
 
 
item        10  30  40  18  20  27  16  34 
  brand      CTL  CTL  CTL  CNTY  CNTY  PET  PET  CNTY 
    fat    WH  WH  WH  FF  RF  RF  WH  WH 
      size  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1 
2  Organic    1  0.052  0.025  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.007  0.011  0.007 
3  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
5  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
9  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
17  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
22  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
39  CTL  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
19  CTL  FF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
26  CTL  FF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
29  CTL  FF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.015  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
13  CTL  LF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
21  CTL  LF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
23  CTL  LF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
37  CTL  LF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
38  CTL  LF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
25  CTL  LF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
35  CTL  LF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
1  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
6  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
11  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
12  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
15  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
31  CTL  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
7  CTL  RF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
8  CTL  RF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
28  CTL  RF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
32  CTL  RF  2  0.099  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
4  CTL  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
14  CTL  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
24  CTL  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
33  CTL  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
36  CTL  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
10  CTL  WH  2  -2.446  0.048  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
30  CTL  WH  2  0.099  -2.542  0.031  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
40  CTL  WH  2  0.100  0.048  -2.127  0.014  0.014  0.008  0.014  0.009 
18  CNTY  FF  1  0.022  0.010  0.007  -1.208  0.037  0.022  0.036  0.023 
20  CNTY  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  -1.359  0.022  0.036  0.023 
27  PET  RF  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  -1.655  0.036  0.023 
16  PET  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  -1.629  0.023 
34  CNTY  WH  1  0.022  0.011  0.007  0.038  0.037  0.022  0.036  -1.502 
41  Outside      0.053  0.025  0.016  0.026  0.025  0.015  0.024  0.016 38 
 
<Table 6 Group Level Elasticities> 
Size      2  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  1  1  1 
  Brand      CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CTL  CNTY  PET  CNTY 
    Fat  Organic  FF  LF  RF  WH  FF  LF  RF  WH  FF  RF  WH 
    Organic  -2.03  0.09  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.09  0.06  0.17  0.09  0.01  0.02  0.02 
1  CTL  FF  0.04  -1.47  0.16  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
1  CTL  LF  0.04  0.28  -1.68  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
1  CTL  RF  0.04  0.28  0.16  -1.46  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
1  CTL  WH  0.04  0.28  0.16  0.30  -1.62  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
2  CTL  FF  0.12  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.06  -2.23  0.11  0.32  0.18  0.01  0.02  0.02 
2  CTL  LF  0.12  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.17  -2.51  0.32  0.18  0.01  0.02  0.02 
2  CTL  RF  0.12  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.17  0.11  -2.15  0.18  0.01  0.02  0.02 
2  CTL  WH  0.12  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.17  0.11  0.32  -2.30  0.01  0.02  0.02 
1  CNTY  FF  0.04  0.28  0.16  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  -1.21  0.06  0.06 
1  PET  RF  0.04  0.28  0.16  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  -1.43  0.06 
1  CNTY  WH  0.04  0.28  0.16  0.30  0.16  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.06  -1.55 
 
 
<Table 7 Variety Effects by Age> 
Age  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
~25  40  5.2  0.129 
25~29  558  113.4  0.203 
30~34  2286  384.9  0.168 
35~39  3250  453.6  0.140 
40~44  4372  543.8  0.124 
45~49  5420  665.8  0.123 
50~54  5242  647.1  0.123 
55~59  8709  886.0  0.102 
60~  8812  891.7  0.101 
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<Table 8 Variety Effects by Education> 
Edu  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
Grade school  450  4.2  0.009 
Some high school  1608  28.1  0.017 
Graduate high school  10621  457.4  0.043 
Some college  10906  980.1  0.090 
Graduate college  10860  1852.7  0.171 
Post college graduate  4244  1268.9  0.299 
 
<Table 9 Variety Effects by Income> 
income  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
Under $5000  295  15.1  0.051 
5000-7999  373  12.2  0.033 
8000-9999  211  7.4  0.035 
10,000-11,999  417  24.3  0.058 
12,000-14,999  1184  65.3  0.055 
15,000-19,999  2391  126.6  0.053 
20,000-24,999  2545  218.7  0.086 
25,000-29,999  2683  217.6  0.081 
30,000-34,999  3504  329.7  0.094 
35,000-39,999  2655  275.3  0.104 
40,000-44,999  2264  243.4  0.108 
45,000-49,999  2383  230.9  0.097 
50,000-59,999  5000  629.2  0.126 
60,000-69,999  3392  483.4  0.143 
70,000-99,999  6261  1125.2  0.180 
100,000 & Over  3131  587.0  0.187 
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<Table 10 Variety Effects by Family Size> 
HHSize  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
1  6491  1028.6  0.158 
2  16157  1922.3  0.119 
3  6870  808.5  0.118 
4  5692  656.7  0.115 
5  2379  149.8  0.063 
6  980  21.5  0.022 
7  96  3.3  0.034 
9  24  0.7  0.028 
 
<Table 11 Variety Effects by the Presence of Child> 
Child  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
0  27298  3347.1  0.123 
1  11391  1244.3  0.109 
 
<Table 12 Variety Effects by Average Age of Children> 
Average age of 
children  _FREQ_  Total  Average 
3  3349  451.7  0.135 
9  2327  285.7  0.123 
12  2216  158.4  0.071 
15  3499  348.5  0.100 
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<Table 13 Predicted Price Change in Raleigh, Durham and Chapel-Hill, median values> 
item  Firm  size  fat  Counterfactual  actual price (post intro)  change after introduction 
1  A  1  2  3.65  3.83  0.19 
4  A  1  3  3.82  3.85  0.03 
5  A  1  0  3.84  3.85  0.01 
7  A  2  2  5.26  5.29  0.02 
10  A  2  3  5.32  5.24  -0.07 
13  A  1  1  3.84  3.84  0 
25  A  2  1  6.25  5.18  -1.07 
26  A  2  0  5.35  5.3  -0.05 
3  B  1  0  3.85  3.98  0.13 
8  B  2  2  5.23  5.38  0.15 
15  B  1  2  3.99  3.92  -0.07 
19  B  2  0  5.41  5.38  -0.03 
21  B  1  1  3.96  3.89  -0.07 
30  B  2  3  6.22  5.38  -0.84 
35  B  2  1  5.43  5.38  -0.05 
38  B  1  1  6.09  3.9  -2.19 
6  C  1  2  3.19  3.35  0.16 
9  C  1  0  3.03  2.92  -0.11 
14  C  1  3  3.3  3.3  -0.01 
23  C  1  1  3  3.08  0.08 
29  C  2  0  3.62  3.51  -0.11 
32  C  2  2  3.96  3.96  0 
40  C  2  3  4.44  4.29  -0.15 
11  D  1  2  2.96  2.89  -0.07 
17  D  1  0  2.87  2.79  -0.08 
33  D  1  3  3.1  3.02  -0.09 
12  E  1  2  3.48  3.45  -0.03 
22  E  1  0  4.98  3.41  -1.56 
24  E  1  3  3.49  3.24  -0.25 
28  E  2  2  6.14  4.43  -1.71 
16  F  1  3  3.28  3.13  -0.14 
18  F  1  0  2.52  2.45  -0.07 
20  F  1  2  2.59  2.67  0.08 
27  F  1  2  3.3  2.99  -0.31 
34  F  1  3  4.94  2.97  -1.97 
31  G  1  2  3.73  3.85  0.12 
36  G  1  3  3.77  3.85  0.08 
37  G  1  1  3.71  3.89  0.18 
39  G  1  0  3.67  3.85  0.18 
41  outside        4.68  4.04  -0.64 
average        4.13  3.87  -0.26 
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<Table 14 Predicted Price Change in Charlotte, median values> 
Item  Firm  size  fat  Counterfactual  actual price (post intro)  change after introduction 
1  A  1  2  3.67  3.62  -0.05 
4  A  1  3  3.69  3.64  -0.05 
5  A  1  0  3.59  3.6  0 
7  A  2  2  5.02  4.93  -0.09 
10  A  2  3  4.95  4.92  -0.03 
13  A  1  1  3.62  3.62  0 
25  A  2  1  5.03  4.97  -0.05 
26  A  2  0  4.97  4.92  -0.05 
3  B  1  0  3.84  3.83  -0.01 
8  B  2  2  5.05  5.12  0.08 
15  B  1  2  3.79  3.85  0.06 
19  B  2  0  5.07  5.13  0.06 
21  B  1  1  3.82  3.87  0.05 
30  B  2  3  5.07  5.01  -0.06 
35  B  2  1  4.99  5.14  0.15 
38  B  1  1  3.87  3.9  0.02 
6  C  1  2  3.22  3.2  -0.03 
9  C  1  0  2.92  2.96  0.04 
14  C  1  3  3.3  3.29  0 
23  C  1  1  2.99  2.96  -0.03 
29  C  2  0  3.5  3.49  -0.01 
32  C  2  2  3.88  3.92  0.04 
40  C  2  3  4.17  4.2  0.04 
11  D  1  2  2.93  2.93  0 
17  D  1  0  2.84  2.85  0.01 
33  D  1  3  3.01  3  -0.02 
12  E  1  2  3.28  3.26  -0.02 
22  E  1  0  3.2  3.15  -0.05 
24  E  1  3  3.38  3.44  0.05 
28  E  2  2  4.35  4.34  -0.01 
16  F  1  3  3.31  3.22  -0.09 
18  F  1  0  2.35  2.42  0.07 
20  F  1  2  2.71  2.72  0.01 
27  F  1  2  3.25  3.28  0.03 
34  F  1  3  2.96  2.97  0.01 
31  G  1  2  3.65  3.63  -0.03 
36  G  1  3  3.54  3.64  0.1 
37  G  1  1  3.54  3.53  -0.01 
39  G  1  0  3.61  3.6  -0.01 
41  outside      4.56  4.08  -0.48 
  average      3.76  3.75  -0.01 
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<Table 15 Marginal Costs in Raleigh, Durham and Chapel-Hill, median values> 
item  Firm  Marginal Cost (MC)  Margins w/ organic  Margins w/o organic  changes in margin 
1  A  1.2  68.28  67.1  1.18 
4  A  1.39  65.15  63.55  1.6 
5  A  1.43  63.58  62.92  0.65 
7  A  2.75  48.61  47.74  0.87 
10  A  2.8  46.59  47.33  -0.74 
13  A  1.42  62.3  62.97  -0.66 
25  A  3.74  26.02  40.22  -14.2 
26  A  2.84  36.48  46.89  -10.41 
3  B  1.62  53.07  57.96  -4.89 
8  B  2.95  31.92  43.65  -11.72 
15  B  1.79  44.83  55.19  -10.37 
19  B  3.12  30.31  42.29  -11.98 
21  B  1.77  41.34  55.13  -13.79 
30  B  3.94  21.69  36.6  -14.91 
35  B  3.17  29.67  41.57  -11.9 
38  B  3.89  1.09  36.08  -34.99 
6  C  0.96  70.66  69.78  0.88 
9  C  0.8  73.28  73.64  -0.36 
14  C  1.04  66.25  68.42  -2.17 
23  C  0.77  64.67  74.32  -9.65 
29  C  1.45  38.21  59.87  -21.66 
32  C  1.81  41.6  54.3  -12.7 
40  C  2.26  27.22  49.05  -21.83 
11  D  0.9  40.93  69.7  -28.77 
17  D  0.81  55.01  71.81  -16.79 
33  D  1.04  52.54  66.54  -13.99 
12  E  1.41  35.94  59.47  -23.53 
22  E  2.96  31.64  40.46  -8.82 
24  E  1.45  37.25  58.56  -21.3 
28  E  4.14  21.67  32.61  -10.94 
2  F  3.04  49.14  N/A  N/A 
16  F  1.06  59.97  67.56  -7.59 
18  F  0.33  89.47  86.9  2.57 
20  F  0.39  76.94  84.98  -8.04 
27  F  1.12  57.82  66.21  -8.39 
34  F  2.74  35.72  44.47  -8.75 
31  G  1.68  54.59  54.92  -0.33 
36  G  1.72  55.23  54.32  0.92 
37  G  1.66  49.32  55.18  -5.86 
39  G  1.62  48.83  55.88  -7.05 
41  outside  1.45  63.99  68.94  -4.95 
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<Table 16 Marginal Costs in Charlotte, median values> 
Item  Firm  Marginal Cost 
(MC)  Margins w/ organic  Margins w/o organic  changes in margin 
1  A  1.28  64.66  65.13  -0.47 
4  A  1.29  64.68  65.17  -0.49 
5  A  1.2  66.5  66.48  0.02 
7  A  2.53  48.63  49.55  -0.92 
10  A  2.47  49.9  50.16  -0.26 
13  A  1.23  66.1  66.1  0 
25  A  2.55  48.69  49.23  -0.54 
26  A  2.5  49.16  49.73  -0.56 
3  B  1.61  58.07  58.13  -0.06 
8  B  2.71  47.16  46.36  0.8 
15  B  1.57  59.25  58.63  0.62 
19  B  2.74  46.55  45.95  0.6 
21  B  1.59  58.79  58.3  0.49 
30  B  2.72  45.73  46.35  -0.62 
35  B  2.68  47.86  46.27  1.59 
38  B  1.65  57.74  57.49  0.25 
6  C  1.01  68.38  68.65  -0.27 
9  C  0.71  75.97  75.61  0.36 
14  C  1.08  67.23  67.26  -0.03 
23  C  0.77  73.87  74.16  -0.29 
29  C  1.34  61.73  61.84  -0.11 
32  C  1.71  56.48  56.01  0.47 
40  C  1.99  52.77  52.37  0.4 
11  D  0.85  70.85  70.87  -0.03 
17  D  0.77  73.08  72.99  0.09 
33  D  0.93  68.79  68.95  -0.16 
12  E  1.19  63.38  63.56  -0.17 
22  E  1.13  64.2  64.77  -0.57 
24  E  1.3  62.2  61.62  0.59 
28  E  2.3  46.89  46.99  -0.1 
2  F  3.04  49.81  N/A  N/A 
16  F  1.1  65.7  66.68  -0.98 
18  F  0.15  93.68  93.48  0.2 
20  F  0.5  81.6  81.53  0.07 
27  F  1.03  68.44  68.16  0.28 
34  F  0.76  74.56  74.51  0.05 
31  G  1.61  55.62  55.92  -0.31 
36  G  1.49  59.11  57.92  1.2 
37  G  1.49  57.67  57.76  -0.1 
39  G  1.56  56.57  56.67  -0.09 
41  outside  1.47  63.99  67.76  -3.77 45 
 
 